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Towards a developmental model of musical empathy using insights from 
children who are on the autism spectrum or who have learning difficulties 
   
   
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter interrogates the notion of ‘musical empathy’ (Livingstone and Thompson, 2009), 
and considers whether it is distinct from the widely acknowledged ‘emotional’ and ‘cognitive’ 
forms of empathy that function for most people in everyday life (Davis, 1996): that is, whether 
it is possible for one person to discern and appreciate others’ musical perspectives, without 
necessarily being able to identify more generally with their thoughts or feelings. It is suggested 
that musical empathy may itself be of two types, ‘affective’ and ‘cognitive’, and that these 
pertain to the ‘content’ and ‘structure’ of music that, according to zygonic theory (Ockelford, 
2005, 2012), make up the warp and the weft of the musical fabric. A challenge of this line of 
thinking is being able to identify contexts in which musical empathy may potentially be isolable 
from ‘everyday’ empathetic thoughts and feelings, and a novel approach is adopted here, which 
considers case studies of children who are on the autism spectrum or who have learning 
difficulties (or both). This is because while research shows that children with autism generally 
find it difficult to grasp how others think and feel, typically lacking ‘theory of mind’ (Baron-
Cohen, 1995), there is evidence to suggest that, in some cases, music may have the capacity to 
act as a vehicle through which they can relate empathetically to other people (Ockelford, 2013; 
Greenberg, Rentfrow and Baron-Cohen, 2015). 
 
Previous research with children with intellectual disabilities, as part of the Sounds of Intent project 
(Welch et al., 2009; Cheng, Ockelford and Welch, 2010; Vogiatzoglou et al., 2011), suggests that, 
while these young people tread essentially the same music-developmental path as their 
‘neurotypical’ peers, the stages of musical understanding that they attain take longer to evolve 
and so are easier to capture, facilitating their identification. The research has had to address 
certain difficulties, however, including the fact that such children may be non-verbal, or at least 
have little or no capacity for metacognition. As a consequence, data tend to be in the form of 
musical rather than verbal products, requiring the specialised music-analytical tools offered by 
zygonic theory to track musical intentionality and influence (Ockelford, 2012). 
 
The results of such analysis undertaken in this study provide evidence that musical empathy 
may indeed exist as a discrete phenomenon, with distinct stages of development that run in 
parallel to the six music-developmental levels identified in Sounds of Intent. These entail 
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traversing an ontogenetic path that potentially ranges from a state in which one has no sense of 
self or of other people (Level 1) to the position of having the (intuitive) notion of a proto-
musical self and other (Level 2); thence having the recognition that there are others who are 
musically ‘like me’, in the moment, (Level 3) to those who are ‘like me, yet different’, to whom 
one can relate beyond the perceived present (Level 4); and so to an awareness that it is possible 
to share a musical journey with another or others through taking a common structural path 
(Level 5) and finally to a realisation that two musicians or more can work together to create a 
blended cognitive-emotional narrative in sound (Level 6). Here musical empathy can extend 
beyond an understanding of the thinking and feelings of the individuals concerned to having a 
sense of the musical psyche of a wider cultural community.  
 
 
What is empathy? 
 
Through introspection and observation, philosophers and psychologists have identified two 
types of empathy: the kind through which we directly come to share the emotions of others, 
through an extension of ‘emotional contagion’ (‘catching’ the emotional states of others 
through being in their presence when they are showing how they feel), and the sort that enables 
us figuratively to put ourselves in others’ shoes, and appreciate their situation on an intellectual 
level (mental activity that may well also have an affective component) – the capacity for so-
called ‘theory of mind’ (see, for example, Håkansson, 2003; de Waal, 2008; Coplan, 2011). In 
recent years, this dual classification has received some neuroscientific support (for example 
Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz and Perry, 2009; Goldman, 2011). 
 
A good deal of theoretical and empirical attention has also been devoted to the related issue of 
how empathy arises in human development (McDonald and Messsinger, 2011), in particular 
exploring Andrew Meltzoff’s contention that infant imitation (which starts in neonates) leads to 
the perception of other people as being ‘like me’, and that others who act in the way that I do 
are likely to have internal states that are ‘like mine’ (Meltzoff and Moore, 1983, 1989; Meltzoff, 
1990, 1995, 2002, 2005). Some believe that a system of mirror neurons, which are activated not 
only when a person undertakes a particular action, but also when the same action is merely 
observed in another (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996; 
Cattaneo and Rizzolatti, 2009) may lie at the heart of empathetic responses (for example, 
Preston and de Waal, 2002; Carr et al., 2003; Gallese, 2003; Miall, 2003; Decety, 2004; Iacoboni, 
2009; Keysers, 2011). Of particular interest in the current context is the finding that mirror 
neurons may be triggered by sounds as well as visual images (Kohler, 2002), and that, through 
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this process, auditory input is capable of stimulating empathetic reactions too (Gazzola, Aziz-
Zadeh and Keysers, 2006). 
 
It is possible to model a mature empathetic response as shown in Figure 1, which sets out the 
potential routes through which one person’s feelings or thoughts (or both) may be transferred 
to another. For example, Person A could convey what she or he thinks or feels (often, though 
not necessarily, elicited by a given set of external circumstances) through language, observable 
behaviours or actions. These may be detected by Person B, and the mental imagery so 
generated evoke similar thoughts and feelings to those of Person A. It is also possible for 
Person B to observe Person A experiencing a given set of circumstances and for these to elicit 
thoughts or feelings directly. 
 
This model makes certain assumptions. For the successful transmission of thoughts or feelings 
to occur and for empathy to be engendered requires that Person B has had a previous 
experience that has enough in common with that encountered by Person A to allow this to be 
appreciated; that Person B and Person A share the connotations of the language, behaviour or 
action that are present; that Person B reacts cognitively or affectively in the same way as Person 
A to a given set of circumstances; and that Person B is aware that his or her thoughts or 
feelings are elicited by the situation or disposition of Person A. 
 
There are potential complications too. For example, Person B can experience empathy for 
someone who does not exist (who is purely imagined, or whose persona is conjured up in a 
novel, play, film or cartoon, for example); Person A may consciously seek to elicit empathetic 
thoughts (where none is actually merited) in Person B through pretence; and Person B may 
experience empathy for Person A who has no related thoughts or feelings – for example, 
Person B may be aware that a tragedy is about to befall Person A, who is, however, ignorant of 
what is shortly going to occur. 
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Figure 1 A model of how empathy may be engendered in everyday contexts. 
 
 
Musical empathy: initial questions 
 
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, given music’s potential for conveying emotion and creating a sense of 
interpersonal connection, the notion of empathy has come to the notice of some researchers in 
the fields of music psychology and education, including, for example, Patrik Juslin (Juslin, 2001, 
2008; Juslin and Västfjäll, 2008), who contends that listeners perceive the emotional expression 
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conveyed by musicians in performance then ‘mimic’ this expression internally, and Seddon 
(1999) and Cross, Laurence and Rabinowitch (2012), who advance the idea of ‘empathic 
creativity’, through which interpersonal attunement may occur in group musical interaction. 
 
But what is ‘musical empathy’? Is it ultimately the same as ‘everyday’ empathy, but elicited via a 
different route (through abstract patterns of sound rather than words or actions, for example)? 
Or is it a way of sharing thoughts and feelings that is fundamentally different? Or can it be 
either according to context? (See Figure 2.) 
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Figure 2 What is ‘musical empathy’? 
 
To facilitate analysis of this issue, we will consider a group in whom musical empathy and 
‘everyday’ empathy appear to be uncoupled – those on the autism spectrum. 
 
 
Autism and empathy 
 
Empathy has become a focus of research in the area of autism, since emotional contagion and 
theory of mind are generally held by psychologists to be two of the principal deficits of those 
on the spectrum (for example, Happé, 1998; Frith, 2003; Baron-Cohen, 2005; Boucher, 2008). 
The conjecture that a defective mirror neuron system may be a contributory – even primary – 
factor in this developmental lacuna has found widespread (though not universal) support: see, 
for instance, Oberman et al. (2005), Williams et al. 2006); Ramachandran and Oberman (2006), 
Hadjikhani (2005), Fan et al. (2010) and Rizzolatti and Fabbri-Destro (2010). At the same time, 
while there are some accounts of young people on the autism spectrum playing music 
inexpressively or with scant regard to the aesthetic intent of fellow performers (Winner, 1996, 
p. 136), other studies have suggested that autistic children can detect the intended emotional 
import of music just as well as their neurotypical peers (Heaton, Hermelin and Pring, 1999), 
and can perform with great sensitivity, with an awareness of the impact of their playing and 
singing on others and sensible to the expressive aspirations of other performers in ensembles 
(Ockelford, 2008, 2013). Indeed, it has been suggested that music-making with others may 
provide a vehicle for engaging the mirror neuron system in children on the autism spectrum 
(Wan et al., 2010). 
 
Hence there may be a mismatch between the degree of empathy exhibited by people with 
autism in day-to-day life and that which they display (and so presumably experience) during 
musical engagement with others. Take, for example, Romy (of whom we will hear more later), 
who, at the time of writing, is 14 years old, severely developmentally delayed, with no formal 
expressive language, and with many of the characteristics of autism: she appears to be oblivious 
to the emotional states of those around her (the obverse of her infectious, effervescent 
egocentricity), and would be wholly unable to appreciate another’s point of view on an 
intellectual level through theory of mind. However, she is a young musician of extraordinary 
sensitivity, and enjoys playing familiar melodies on the piano with her right hand alone to the 
author’s improvised accompaniments, not only following the tempo, dynamics, and articulation 
that are offered (in accordance with the expressive conventions of Western classical 
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performance), but also predicting what her co-performer is likely to do next: delaying the 
placement of notes at the climaxes of phrases, for example, and even pushing the temporal 
envelope through rubato further than in the model that is provided. Observers comment on 
how Romy not only appears to have an intuitive understanding of the emotional narrative of 
the music that is projected from the accompaniment, but that they find her playing musically 
persuasive and genuinely moving – a feeling that she seems to share, as she will often vocalise 
excitedly at the melodic climaxes that she articulates so compelling and vigorously flap her left 
hand (both indicators of a positive affective response), as though intoxicated by the products of 
a shared musical discourse. 
 
So what is happening here? To reiterate our central question: is the empathy that Romy is able 
to experience in a musical context different from ‘everyday’ empathy? Or does music offer a 
route to empathetic engagement with another that she cannot otherwise access? In either case, 
is this something that is unique to Romy, or to people with autism and learning difficulties 
more generally, or could it be that many (or all) of us have the potential to experience a distinct, 
musical form of empathy? And if musical empathy does exist as a mental entity in its own right, 
does it evolve in line with a child’s musical development? 
 
We will address these issues through a series of case studies of children at different stages in the 
development of their musical abilities. We will structure our discussion in terms of the Sounds of 
Intent framework, which, created through over a decade of research in the field, seeks to map 
musical development in children and young people with learning difficulties, including those 
with autism (see, for example, Ockelford et al., 2005; Welch et al., 2009; Cheng, Ockelford and 
Welch, 2010; Ockelford and Matawa, 2010; Ockelford et al., 2011; Vogiatzoglou et al., 2011). 
Underpinning Sounds of Intent is ‘zygonic’ theory, which sets out to explain how music works as 
a communicative medium: how it is that abstract patterns of sound are able to convey meaning, 
and what the nature of that meaning is. And it is to this theory that we now turn our attention. 
 
 
 
The zygonic conjecture 
 
In seeking to describe zygonic theory, we will consider first the issue of meaning in language-
based art forms, which, as a reflection of an external ‘reality’ or potential, have a more evident 
source of meaning construction. According to T.S. Eliot (1933; 1960), literature has three 
principal sources of meaning (couched in terms of aesthetic response): 
 
• an objective correlative – a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events, which shall be the 
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‘formula of a particular emotion’; 
• the manner of representation (including, for example, the use of metaphor); 
• the sound qualities and structure of the language itself. 
 
This thinking may be represented as shown in Figure 3. In semiotic terms, the model captures 
the stages corresponding to the transition from: 
 
• semantics (the relationships between signs and the things to which they refer); through 
• syntactics (the relationships between signs); to 
• pragmatics (the relationships between the signs and the effects they have on readers or 
listeners). 
 
 
Figure 3  Representation of T.S. Eliot’s model of aesthetic response to literary works, and its 
correspondence to semiotic thinking.  
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However, absolute music (and the abstract component of music with referential meaning) has 
no objective correlative – no semantic component (see Figure 4). In these circumstances, how 
is meaning constructed and conveyed?  
 
  
Figure 4  Absolute music has no objective correlative – so how is meaning conveyed?  
In the absence of semantics, it follows that the meaning of music must derive solely from its 
syntax – the logical arrangement of its constituent sounds – which has two elements: the 
qualities of the sounds themselves (in zygonic theory referred to as ‘content’) and their 
organisation (termed ‘structure’). 
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Laird and Oatley, 1992; Sparshott, 1994, p. 28). There appear to be two main sources of such 
responses (a) ‘expressive non-verbal vocalisations’ and (b) ‘music-specific’ qualities of sound. 
 
‘Expressive non-verbal vocalisations’ comprise the cues used to express emotions vocally in 
non-verbal communication and speech (Juslin, Friberg and Bresin, 2001). They are present 
cross-culturally (Scherer, Banse and Wallbott, 2001), suggesting a common phylogenetic 
derivation from ‘non-verbal affect vocalisations’ (Scherer, 1991) and apparently embedded 
ontogenetically in early maternal/infant interaction (Malloch, 1999; Trehub and Nakata, 
2001/2002). It seems that these cues can be transferred in a general way to music, and music-
psychological work from the last 70 years or so has shown that features such as register, tempo 
and dynamic level do relate with some consistency to particular emotional states (Gabrielsson 
and Lindström, 2001). For example, passages in a high register can feel exciting (Watson, 1942) 
or exhibit potency (Scherer and Oshinsky, 1977), whereas series of low notes are more likely to 
promote solemnity or to be perceived as serious (Watson, op. cit.). A fast tempo will tend to 
induce feelings of excitement (Thompson and Robitaille, 1992), in contrast to slow tempi that 
may connote tranquility (Gundlach, 1935) or even peace (Balkwill and Thompson, 1999). Loud 
dynamic levels are held to be exciting (Watson, op. cit.), triumphant (Gundlach, op. cit.) or to 
represent gaiety (Nielzén and Cesarec, 1982), while quiet sounds have been found to express 
fear, tenderness or grief (Juslin, 1997). Conversely, as Leonard Meyer observes (2001, p. 342), 
‘one cannot imagine sadness being portrayed by a fast forte tune played in a high register, or a 
playful child being depicted by a solemnity of trombones’. 
 
‘Music-specific’ qualities of sound, like those identified above in relation to early vocalisation, 
have the capacity to induce consistent emotional responses, within and sometimes between 
cultures. For example, in the West and elsewhere, music typically utilises a framework of 
relative pitches with close connections to the harmonic series. These are used idiosyncratically, 
with context-dependent frequency of occurrence and transition patterns, together yielding the 
sensation of ‘tonality’ (Krumhansl, 1997; Peretz, Gagnon and Bouchard, 1998). These 
frameworks of relative pitch can accommodate different ‘modalities’, each potentially bearing 
distinct emotional connotations. In Indian music, for example, the concept of the ‘raga’ is 
based on the idea that particular patterns of notes are able to evoke heightened states of 
emotion (Jairazbhoy, 1971/1995), while in the Western tradition of the last four centuries or 
so, the ‘major mode’ is typically associated with happiness and the ‘minor mode’ with sadness 
(Hevner, 1936; Crowder, 1985), differences which have been shown to have neurological 
correlates (Suzuki, et al., 2008; Nemoto, Fujimaki and Wang, 2010). 
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On their own, however, separate emotional responses to a series of individual sounds or 
clusters would not add up to a coherent musical message – a unified aesthetic response that 
evolves over time. So what is it that binds these discrete, abstract experiences together to form 
a cogent musical narrative? It is my contention that organising force is ‘structure’, as defined in 
zygonic theory. 
 
To understand how this works, consider verbal language once more. Eliot’s ‘objective 
correlative’ is likely to be a series of events, actions, feelings or thoughts that are in some way 
logically related, each contingent on another or others through concepts such as causation. 
Relationships like these will be conveyed and given additional layers of meaning through 
language-specific relationships such as metaphor (in the domain of ‘manner of representation’), 
rhyme and meter (in the domain of ‘sounding qualities’) and syntax (in the domain of 
‘structure’) – see Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5  The forms of logical relationship underpinning meaning in language. 
But how does a comparable sense of coherence and unity – a sense of structure – come about 
in music, when it cannot borrow a sense of contingency from the external world? In the 
absence of an objective correlative, musical events can refer only to themselves (Selincourt, 1920). 
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but one can imply another (Meyer, 1989, pp. 84ff) through a sense of derivation. That is, one 
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musical event can be felt to stem from another, and it is my contention that this occurs 
through imitation: if one fragment or feature of music echoes another, then it owes the nature 
of its existence to its model. And just as certain perceptual qualities of sound are felt to derive 
from one another, so too, it is hypothesised, are the emotional responses to each. Hence over 
time a metaphorical (musical) narrative can be built up through abstract patterns of sound. 
 
Figure 6  Relationships underpinning logic in music. 
The agency through which musical implication occurs is held to be a particular kind of 
perceived relationship that acknowledges the qualities of separate sounds that are the same or 
similar. Such relationships – purely mental constructs – are termed ‘zygonic’, after the Greek 
‘zygon’, meaning a ‘yoke’ or connection between similar things (Ockelford, 1991). The musical 
effect of a zygonic relationship is that a second event seems to derive from one that precedes, or, 
conversely, that a given event appears to generate one that follows. The underlying imitation can 
be exact or approximate, and refer to part or the whole of a musical event. Relationships can be 
of different levels: ‘primary’, between percepts themselves; ‘secondary’, between perceptual 
differences; and ‘tertiary’, between the relationships between differences. 
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Figure 7  Representation of primary zygonic relationship. 
 
Zygonic theory holds that the cognition of musical structure occurs at three levels in the 
domains of pitch and perceived time, and that these pertain to ‘events’, ‘groups’ and 
‘frameworks’ (Ockelford, 2006, 2011). Essentially the same conjecture pertains to groups and 
frameworks as to events: that musical structure will be cognised when one musical element or 
feature is heard as imitating another. Given young children’s propensity to copy sounds and to 
relish being copied, it seems that the neural correlates of zygonic relationships must emerge 
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recognising the imitation of one musical event by another) and proactively (creating one musical 
event by copying another). How this ability subsequently evolves to enable young listeners to 
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frameworks of pitch and perceived time within which pieces of music are typically cast, is the 
subject of other research (Ockelford and Voyajolu, n.d.). For example, the way in which 
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bars of Beethoven’s 5th Symphony. 
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more than the perceived present. Zygonic connections between groups necessarily involve four 
events or more (Ockelford, 2006, p. 109), whose temporal disposition is potentially far more 
variable, possibly implicating long-term memory. Here there may also be a greater degree of 
abstraction from the perceptual ‘surface’, when it is relationships between the events within 
each group that are being compared (as in the example shown – see Figure 9). Imitative links 
between frameworks appear to be the most cognitively demanding of all. They depend on the 
existence of long-term ‘schematic’ memories (Bharucha, 1987) – in the case of a listener 
stylistically attuned to the Beethoven symphony, for example, built up from substantial 
exposure to other pieces in the minor mode. Here, it is assumed that the details of the 
perceptual surface and individual connections perceived between musical events are not 
encoded in long-term memory discretely or independently, but are combined with many 
thousands of other similar data to create probabilistic networks of relationships between 
notional representations of pitch and perceived time. That is, large amounts of perceptual 
information are merged to enable the requisitely parsimonious deep level of cognitive 
abstraction to occur. 
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Figure 8  The differing cognitive demands of processing musical structure at the level of events, groups 
and frameworks. 
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Figure 9  Zygonic connections between groups of notes frequently involve the cognition of 
relationships between relationships. 
 
In summary, then, it is hypothesised that the cognitive correlates of musical structure grow in 
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from hundreds of observations of young people engaging with music in a range of everyday 
contexts. 
 
For example, an appreciation of imitation at the level of events is implied by Zeeshan’s laughing 
and rocking ‘when he hears his teacher imitating Tom’s vocal sounds’, an understanding that is 
translated into action by Xavier, who ‘distinctly tries to copy high notes and low notes in vocal 
interaction sessions’ (Ockelford, 2012, pp. 130 and 133). Lottie seems to be able to recognise 
group structures, since she ‘cries whenever she hears the “goodbye” song. It only takes the first 
two or three notes to be played on the keyboard, and she experiences a strong emotional 
reaction.’ This capacity is realised in sound by Lottie, who ‘hums distinct patterns of notes and 
repeats them. Her favourite sounds rather like a playground chant, and she repeats it from one 
day to the next’ (Ockelford, op. cit., pp. 129 and 130). Quincy, who ‘knows that when his music 
teacher plays the last verse of Molly Malone in the minor key it signifies sadness’ shows some 
non-conceptual understanding of how pitch frameworks work in the Western musical vernacular, 
while Janet, with severe learning difficulties, has taken Quincy’s intuitive grasp of mode a stage 
further, having ‘developed the confidence to introduce new material on her saxophone in the 
school’s jazz quartet’, Ockelford (ibid.). 
 
Although much of the data gathered in the course of the Sounds of Intent project comprised 
‘snapshots’ of children’s musical engagement at a single point in time, rather than offering 
longitudinal accounts, two developmental features of music-structural cognition did become 
apparent. First, as one would expect, it appeared that the successively more extensive cognitive 
abilities required to process musical structure at the level of events, groups and frameworks 
arise sequentially in development. The evidence for this stemmed from the observation that 
there were no instances of children showing music-structural engagement at the level of 
frameworks who were not also able to recognise or create imitative patterns involving groups, 
nor of children who could process or produce group structures who could not also operate 
cognitively at the level of events. Second, it became evident that the cognitive capacities 
pertaining to each structural level do not emerge fully functioning, but themselves evolve 
incrementally: that is to say, as well as music-structural processing developing between levels, 
there also appeared to be development within each of them.  
 
In addition, the Sounds of Intent data suggested precursors to the three stages of music-structural 
cognition whose postulated existence they substantiated. To frame these developmental 
antecedents theoretically, consider that imitation, which lies at the heart of zygonic theory, can 
only have significance in the context of potential variety. This is because for one sound (or 
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aspect of sound) to be heard as deriving from another – for the concept of agency in repetition 
to exist – requires a (hypothetical) range of options to be available. That is to say, before 
children can appreciate or make imitatively generated patterns in sound, they need to be able to 
process or create a range of sonic alternatives. This in turns implies that they will have had 
many, diverse listening experiences and sound-making opportunities. Examples of children 
functioning at this level who were observed in the course of the Sounds of Intent project include 
Rick, whose ‘eye movements intensify when he hears the big band play’ and Oliver, who 
‘scratches the tambourine, making a range of sounds … whenever he plays near the rim and the 
bells jingle, he smiles’ (Ockelford, et al., 2011, pp. 179 and 180). 
 
A few of the children who were involved in the Sounds of Intent research appeared to be at a 
stage before this one of developing auditory perception, when the processing of sound had yet 
to get underway at all. Examples included Anna, who 
 
sits motionless in her chair. Her teacher approaches and plays a cymbal with a soft beater, 
gently at first, and then more loudly, in front of her and then near to each ear. She does 
not appear to react. 
 
and Yerik, who 
 
usually makes a rasping sound as he breathes. He seems to be unaware of what he is 
doing, and the rasping persists, irrespective of external stimulation. His class teacher has 
tried to see whether Yerik can be made aware of his sounds by making them louder (using 
a microphone, amplifier and speakers), but so far this approach has met with no response. 
 
(Ockelford, 2012, p. 129). 
 
It seemed that nothing could precede this pre-perceptual stage, so it was termed (Sounds of 
Intent) Level 1. The pre-structural stage, referred to above, of which Rick and Oliver provided 
examples, was called Level 2. The three stages of structural cognition, pertaining to events, 
groups and frameworks, were designated respectively Levels 3, 4 and 5. These five levels, while 
covering a vast range of musical development, did not seem to present a complete picture, 
however, as there were examples of children engaging with music who were more or less 
consciously manipulating the parameters of sound – pitch, timing, loudness and timbre – to 
achieve particular expressive ends. For instance, Ciara 
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who is a good vocalist despite having severe learning difficulties, is learning how to 
convey a range of different emotions in her singing through using techniques such as 
vibrato, rubato, consciously using a wider range of dynamics, and producing darker and 
lighter sounds. 
 
And Ruth, 
 
who sings well, and is used to performing in public, although she has severe learning 
difficulties and autism. She can learn new songs just by listening to her teacher (who is not 
a trained singer) run through them, and as she gets to know a piece, she intuitively adds 
expression as she feels appropriate. … Later, when she listens to other people singing the 
songs she knows, she clearly prefers some performances to others. Her teacher believes 
this shows that she has a mature engagement with pieces in mid-to-late twentieth-century 
popular style. 
 
(Ockelford, 2012, p. 129). 
 
This stage of musical development, in which young people appeared to be aware of the 
culturally determined rules of expressive performance, was labelled Level 6.  
 
The six Sounds of Intent levels, and the core cognitive abilities associated with each, can be 
summarised as follows (Ockelford, 2012, p. 148). See Table 1. 
 
Level Description Acronym Core cognitive abilities 
1 Confusion and Chaos C No awareness of sound  
2 Awareness and Intentionality I 
An emerging awareness of sound and of the variety that is possible 
within the domain of sound 
3 Relationships, repetition Regularity R 
A growing awareness of the possibility and significance of relationships 
between sonic events  
4 Sounds forming Clusters C 
An evolving perception of groups of sounds and of the relationships that 
may exist between them 
5 Deeper structural Links L 
A growing recognition of whole pieces, and of the frameworks of pitch 
and perceived time that lie behind them 
6 Mature artistic Expression E 
A developing awareness of the culturally determined ‘emotional syntax’ 
of performance that articulates the ‘narrative metaphor’ of pieces 
 
Table 1  The six levels underpinning the Sounds of Intent framework (acronym ‘CIRCLE’). 
 
The Sounds of Intent research further divided the universe of potential musical engagement into 
three domains: ‘reactive’ (‘R’), which entailed listening and responding to sounds; ‘proactive’ 
(‘P’), which involved causing, creating or controlling sounds; and ‘interactive’ (‘I’), which meant 
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participating in sound-making activity in the context of others. Conceptually, the three domains 
and six levels were orthogonal, implying that they could be represented as a matrix with 18 
cells. This was represented visually as a series of concentric circles divided into segments, 
ranging from the centre (Level 1), with its focus on self, to the outermost ring (Level 6), with its 
reference to wider communities of others. The convention of denoting each segment by its 
domain (R, P or I) followed by its level (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6) was used. Hence ‘R.1’ refers to 
‘Reactive Level 1’, ‘P.3’ to ‘Proactive Level 3’, and ‘I.6’ to ‘Interactive Level 6’. Brief descriptors 
were developed for the segments, which sought to summarise the nature of the musical 
engagement that each involved. See Figure 10. 
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Figure 10  Visual representation of the Sounds of Intent framework. 
 
Implications of the Sounds of Intent music-developmental model for our understanding of the 
evolving sense of self in children with learning difficulties 
 
Ockelford and Welch (2012) and Ockelford and Vorhaus (2015) explored the connection 
between the music-developmental levels identified in the Sounds of Intent framework and the 
evolving sense of self found in children with learning difficulties. To do this, the Sounds of Intent 
levels were matched to an extended version of the model of early expressive communication set 
out in Ockelford (2002). The result is shown in Table 2. 
 
Phase of 
expressive 
communication 
Vocal / verbal 
level of 
development 
Corresponding 
Sounds of Intent 
proactive levels 
Corresponding 
Sounds of Intent 
interactive levels 
non-intentional cries in response 
to need 
P.1 
makes sounds unknowingly 
I.1 
unwittingly relates through sound 
intentional deliberately vocalises 
to show need 
P.2 
causes, creates or controls sound 
intentionally 
I.2 
interacts with another or others 
using sound 
symbolic 
makes personal 
utterances: 
for example, says 
‘mmm’ meaning 
‘hair dryer’ 
P.3 
intentionally makes patterns in sound 
through repetition or regularity 
I.3 
interacts by imitating other’s sounds 
or recognising self being imitated 
P.4 
creates or re-creates short groups of 
musical sounds and links them coherently 
I.4 
engages in musical dialogues, 
creating and recognising coherent 
connections between groups of 
sounds 
formal speaks (using words) 
P.5 
performs or improvises music of growing 
length and complexity, increasingly ‘in 
time’ and ‘in tune’ 
I.5 
performs or improvises music of 
growing length and complexity with 
others, using increasingly developed 
ensemble skills 
pragmatic 
uses language with 
appropriate social 
understanding 
P.6 
seeks to communicate through music 
through expressive performance or by 
creating pieces that are intended to 
convey particular effects 
I.6 
makes music expressively with 
another or others, with a widening 
repertoire in a range of different 
styles and genres 
 
Table 2 The Sounds of Intent levels mapped onto the developmental stages of expressive communication. 
 
This composite developmental map was aligned with the notion of an evolving self through 
reference to Shaun Gallagher’s distinction between the minimal self, considered as ‘a 
consciousness of oneself as an immediate subject of experience, unextended in time’, and the 
narrative self, considered as ‘self-image that is constituted with a past and a future in the various 
stories that we and others tell about ourselves’ (Gallagher, 2000, p. 15). The outcome is shown 
in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11  Putative parallels between stages of musical development and an evolving sense of self. 
 
The discussion that follows extends this thinking (which conceives of musical engagement as a 
proxy indicator of a sense of self): conceptualising musical reactivity, proactivity and 
interactivity at different development levels as a window onto the evolving empathetic mind of 
children with learning difficulties and autism. To this end, we present six vignettes of musical 
engagement at each of the six Sounds of Intent levels, with reflections on each of these in terms of 
their implications for the children’s awareness of and sensitivity to others’ musical thinking and 
feeling, and for our understanding of musical empathy more generally. 
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Six vignettes 
 
1. Amelia 
 
A teaching assistant pushes Amelia in her wheelchair into the music room to join her class for 
their weekly session with the music therapist. All six children in the group, who are 13 or 14 years 
of age, have profound and multiple learning difficulties, meaning that they are in the very early 
stages of cognitive, emotional and social development. In previous sessions, the therapist has 
been unable to discern any response from Amelia to the wide range of musical sounds – 
particularly vocal sounds – that have been presented. And today is the same: Amelia reclines 
motionless in her chair, gaze fixed, apparently not making sense of visual stimuli. She makes no 
discernible response to any of the sounds that are presented, nor any observable attempt to make 
sound deliberately with her voice or by moving her fingers against a lightweight wind chime that 
is placed next to her hand. Although she sometimes wheezes as she exhales, the therapist’s efforts 
to make Amelia aware of this by using a microphone and amplification system do not elicit a 
response or change in her breathing pattern. Amelia makes no noticeable attempts to interact 
with her assistant who, as the session progresses, sensitively tries to engage her through touch, 
sight and sound, emulating and complementing the breathy sounds that Amelia makes. 
 
Amelia appears to be oblivious to the sounds around her (and of stimuli in other sensory 
domains), and she seems to be unaware of her capacity to make noises as a product of her own 
bodily functions such as breathing. Inevitably, then, she is unable to interact knowingly through 
sound. Hence we can assume that she is functioning at Sounds of Intent Level 1. What does this 
mean in terms of empathy? As have seen, according to Meltzoff, having a sense of other 
requires first a sense of self. Yet there are no indications that Amelia has reached this stage of 
awareness, let alone a notion of self and other. Hence we must conclude that she is not yet 
capable of experiencing musical empathy, either affectively or cognitively (see Figures 12 
and 13). The music therapist, however, intuitively interprets Amelia’s sounds in the context of 
communication, and responses are musically empathetic. The teaching assistant too, by 
responding sensitively to Amelia’s sounds is exhibiting musical empathy, or, as Cross, Laurence 
and Rabinowitch (2012) would have it, being ‘creatively empathic’. 
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Figure 12 Amelia shows no signs of reactive or proactive musical empathy (Level 1). 
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Figure 13 Amelia shows no signs of interactive musical empathy (Level 1). 
 
 
2. Ethan 
 
Ethan is six. He has profound global developmental delay, and he functions in many ways as 
though he were around four or five months old. His mother notices that he is becoming more 
aware of the sounds around him, and he appears to respond in particular to the female human 
voice, sometimes picking up on the emotions that are expressed. He tends to find it upsetting 
when he hears someone cry, for example – particularly other children, such as his baby brother – 
and will occasionally smile when others laugh. Ethan can himself make a range of vocal sounds, 
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which he uses to express how he is feeling: happy, sad, excited, frustrated, angry or quietly 
content. He is beginning to realise that his vocalisations can have an effect on other people, and 
when he sees someone he knows, he will often try to engage them through making a sound, and 
waiting for a response. He will also vocalise when people speak or sing to him, though there is no 
evidence of deliberate imitation on his part. 
 
This account of Ethan suggests that he has an emerging awareness of sound and of the variety 
that is possible within the auditory domain. He has a sense of his own capacity to make a range 
of sounds, and interacts through sound with other people. Hence it is reasonable to assert that 
he is functioning at Sounds of Intent Level 2. In terms of the development of musical empathy, 
we can assume that Ethan’s sense of agency, derived from his ability to create sound, and his 
capacity to externalise his feelings through sound, must contribute to an evolving sense of self – 
of his own identity in relation to others. This is shown by his realising that he can affect others 
through his sound-making, and his desire for other people to reciprocate when he vocalises. 
His sense of other is evident too in the emotional contagion he experiences when those around 
him cry or laugh. By having the capacity to be stimulated through sounds expressive of emotion 
to feel what others feel (rather as newborns do – see Simner, 1971; Sagi and Hoffman, 1976; 
Martin and Clark, 1982), and despite (presumably) being unable to reflect on this process, it 
seems reasonable nonetheless to assert that Ethan is capable of experiencing a basic form of 
affective (though not yet cognitive) empathy in the domain of sound (Zahn-Waxler and Radke-
Yarrow, 1990; McDonald and Messinger, 2011). Strictly speaking, this cannot be considered to 
be ‘musical empathy’, since, according to zygonic theory, the characteristic that distinguishes 
music from other forms of sound (such as speech and everyday noise) is the presence of 
repetition deemed to be brought about through imitation. Hence a more accurate term might 
be ‘proto-musical empathy’ – see Figures 14 and 15. 
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Figure 14  Ethan shows signs of reactive and proactive proto-musical empathy (Level 2). 
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Figure 15 Ethan shows signs of interactive proto-musical ‘empathic creativity’ (Level 2). 
 
 
3. Chloe 
 
Chloe has severe learning difficulties. She is eight years old. She has a vocabulary of around 10 
words that she uses to communicate some of her basic needs, and, beyond this, her family and 
the staff at her school have learnt to interpret a range of idiosyncratic gestures that she makes, 
such as flapping her hand for ‘more’. In day-to-day life, Chloe gives little or no sense of being 
aware of, or concerned about, other people’s circumstances, thoughts or feelings. However, she 
loves it when people copy the sounds that she produces – when they do it makes her laugh – and 
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she never seems to get bored, flapping her hand enthusiastically. Sometimes she tries to copy 
other people too, especially the funny sounds that they make with their voices, and she can 
become excited when she gets it right. Chloe also likes banging things loudly on hard surfaces 
(such as her kitchen table at home or the wooden floor in her classroom), using anything she has 
to hand, making regular beats that go on and on, and if her class teacher starts clapping or 
tapping a steady pulse, she can anticipate what comes next and join in. The nature of the sound 
that is made seems less important to Chloe than the regularity of the beat. She also enjoys 
listening to any pieces with a strong rhythmic drive – especially the relentless uniformity of dance 
music. 
 
It seems that Chloe appreciates simple patterns of repetition and imitation in sound, in relation 
to listening, to her own production and through interaction with other people. Hence she 
appears to be functioning at Sounds of Intent Level 3, which has a number of implications for her 
capacity to think and feel music-empathetically. For instance, her ability to copy some of the 
sounds that other people make (and the pleasure that she takes in doing so) suggests that she 
has some sense of ‘being like them’ (Meltzoff, 2005). Moreover, that fact that she is aware of 
being imitated means that she may have a notion, at some level, of those people ‘being like her’. 
(See Figure 16.) Hence, in Meltzoff’s terms, Chloe intuitively knows that there is someone else 
out there who is ‘like her but isn’t her’ – the first step towards her having a fully-fledged theory 
of mind. Beyond this, since Chloe can sustain a regular beat, which requires both memory and 
anticipation, we can surmise that (albeit non-consciously) her sense of self, in the form of her 
thoughts and feelings expressed in sound, extends from the perceived present into the recent 
past and the immediate future. Furthermore, her capacity to continue simple patterns started by 
others shows that she has moved beyond reacting to what they think and do to predicting their 
thoughts and actions: a further development in her evolving theory of mind (Figure 17). The 
fact that it is the regularity of the beat that is made (as opposed to the nature of its constituent 
sounds) suggests that musical structure is more significant to her than content – in empathetic 
terms, that thoughts are more important than feelings, that cognition is of more consequence 
than affect. 
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Figure 16  Chloe shows reactive and proactive musical empathy in the moment (Level 3). 
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Figure 17 Chloe and her class teacher share musical empathic creativity in the moment through playing 
a common regular beat: ‘she is like me’ and ‘I am like her’ (Level 3). 
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He likes noodling on the keyboard, playing scraps of tunes that he has heard – often the short 
‘hooks’ from pop songs, some of which he appears to like partly through their association with 
his father, who plays in a band. He will repeat simple jazz riffs too, apparently relishing the fact 
that he can create an ongoing stream of sound. Although processing and producing verbal 
language appears to be something of an effort for Drew, he relaxes and evidently enjoys it when 
his music teacher sits down with him at the keyboard, and the two of them have extended 
conversations in sound, using short bursts of melodic material, sometimes copying exactly what 
the other has just done, and sometimes engaging in ‘call and response’ patterns, where ideas are 
changed as they bounce back and forth. During these interactions, Drew makes frequent eye 
contact with his teacher, and smiles from time to time, seeming to delight in the engagement with 
another person that music enables him to make. 
 
Drew’s preoccupation with ‘chunks’ of musical material suggests that he is functioning in 
music-developmental terms at Sounds of Intent Level 4. His capacity not only to repeat motifs but 
to develop them when interacting with his music teacher suggests, in terms of musical empathy, 
that he has moved beyond Meltzoff’s notion of understanding that he is ‘like his teacher yet not 
him’ (Sounds of Intent Level 3) to acknowledging (albeit intuitively) that he is ‘like his teacher yet 
different from him’. That is, although Drew’s empathic capacity lies within a relatively narrow 
cognitive and affective range, his musical theory of mind appears to have developed to the 
point where he can grasp that another person’s ideas about a fragment of music may be 
congruent with his own, yet distinct from it. There is a sense too that his appreciation of 
another’s musical perspective extends beyond the immediate present (as experienced by Chloe), 
and that he recognises that other people’s musical thinking may change over time: his music 
teacher does not always give the same response when Drew plays a particular riff, yet Drew is 
aware, at some level, that each of his teacher’s distinct musical rejoinders arises from the same 
musical mind. The more extensive temporal envelope of conscious thought that is open to 
Drew (compared with Chloe) means that longer term memories can feature in his music-
empathetic thoughts and feelings too: in particular, he is aware that the thinking and emotion 
that he associates with particular chunks of music may also be experienced by his music 
teacher. Yet outside the context of music-making, Drew struggles to get inside other people’s 
heads; his language is too limited for him to convey or understand anything beyond 
information pertaining to his own immediate circumstances, needs or wants. Paradoxically, it is 
when he is freed from the constraints and frustrations of trying to use sounds with 
propositional meaning (words), and interacts instead using sounds with no symbolic meaning 
(notes), that Drew is able to glean insights into other people’s minds – thoughts and feelings 
that the adults around him resort to describing with verbal language. 
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Figure 18  Drew shows reactive and proactive musical empathy through sharing a musical motif with 
his teacher, which has associative memories (Level 4). 
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Figure 19  Drew and his music teacher share musical empathic creativity beyond the immediate present, 
that changes over time through a ‘call and response’ sequence using a short motif (Level 4). 
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human contact seems to driven more by hedonism than a concern for other’s thoughts and 
feelings. He has a narrow range of interests, including music, in which domain he has exceptional 
talents (including absolute pitch) and is highly motivated, in a reactive way, spending a good deal 
of his leisure time listening to a wide range of music on his iPad – often the same piece over and 
over again. Proactively, however, he is rather more reluctant to engage in music making, and, 
despite having been learning the piano for around two years, he still usually displays an initial 
reluctance to get involved in lessons. Once he is over the participation threshold, though, he will 
sing and play with enthusiasm, often rocking vigorously to the beat. Freddie loves music that is, in 
every way, repetitive – the more highly structured the better, it seems – preferably with repeated 
notes, repeated phrases, and repeated sections, characteristic of such 1970s classics as Eye Level 
(popularly known as the Van der Valk TV theme) and Rockin’ All Over the World (Status Quo), 
which he enjoys. He will improvise melodies over renditions of pieces that he knows, such as 
Twinkle, Twinkle, singing (wordlessly) or playing the keyboard. However, his productions of 
musical material, with or without other people, come across as having a ‘mechanical’ quality, 
which privileges repetition over change, precision over nuance – in the language of zygonic 
theory, structure over content. 
 
In music-developmental terms, Freddie’s capacity to improvise a tune over a familiar series of 
harmonies indicates that he has an intuitive grasp of typical Western intervallic and metrical 
frameworks (an ability that characterises of Sounds of Intent Level 5). With regard to musical 
empathy, Freddie has a somewhat lopsided profile in which the cognitive element is 
predominant. However, this is sufficient for him to have a sense of engaging with other people 
in a common musical purpose over time – sharing a given melodic and harmonic framework 
and producing either the same or complementary material. Hence we can surmise that Freddie 
is aware at some level that he and another person can experience periods of shared musical 
attention in which both parties make distinct contributions to a coherent musical whole; that is, 
someone else may have thoughts that differ from his yet are nonetheless congruent with them. 
This level of understanding appears to show that Freddie’s capacity empathy in the domain of 
music is considerably more advanced than that available to him in everyday life. 
	  
 36 
 
Figure 20  Freddie shows reactive and proactive musical empathy, which is largely cognitive in nature 
(Level 5), and reveals an asymmetrical pattern of empathy with his piano teacher (who appreciates 
Freddie’s playing both cognitively and affectively). 
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Figure 21  Freddie and his piano teacher share an asymmetrical musical empathic creativity through 
engaging in a common cognitive purpose over time in the domain of music (Level 5). 
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to Say I Love You – in the form a melody and a rudimentary bass line (on account of the relative 
weakness of her left hand), articulating the structure and content using devices such as rubato and 
changes in dynamics, improvising fills, and delighting in the impact that her performance has on 
listeners in close proximity. Romy likes to be entertained too, and will listen intently to renditions 
of favourite works, such as Bach’s little’ Prelude in F, BWV 928, relishing the climaxes that are 
marked out with ritardandi and crescendi, jumping up, flapping her hands and sometimes shrieking 
with pleasure as a physical embodiment of the strong emotions that she feels. Interactively, in 
piano duets improvised on pieces such as the Cavatina from the film the Deer Hunter, Romy, 
playing the melody, will not only follow the tempo, articulation and dynamic contours that her 
co-performer offers, but she will also predict, with some accuracy, the expressive devices that her 
accompanist is likely to use. These include holding back the onsets of notes at the top of phrases, 
sometimes to an even greater extent than her fellow performer, and exaggerating the dynamics. 
Romy is increasing comfortable in interacting with a range of other musicians, and she seems to 
enjoy testing the limits of their capabilities (by deliberating changing key) and challenging their 
aesthetic sensibilities (by pushing the expressive envelope even further than usual). 
 
Despite her technical limitations on the piano, Romy’s expressive playing and her sophisticated 
interactions with other musicians suggest that she has a mature understanding of several styles 
of music within her culture, implying that she is functioning at Sounds of Intent Level 6. Of 
course, one could contend that Romy has merely learnt to emulate the elements of expressive 
performance without herself feeling the emotions of which they were originally an expression – 
an argument that is occasionally levelled at musical savants such as Derek Paravicini 
(Ockelford, 2008). This line of reasoning can be difficult to counter since neither Romy nor, 
indeed, Derek are able to reflect verbally on their responses to music. However, the fact that 
Romy’s feelings are embodied in movement and conveyed through screams of delight, and that 
these correspond to what would generally be acknowledged as emotional peaks in the music, 
suggest that here is something more than mere imitation of the nuances of another’s 
performance. And Romy’s tendency on occasion to push expressivity beyond that of her co-
performers also hints at a genuinely advanced level of musicality. In terms of musical empathy, 
it appears that Romy has the capacity and the desire to share a common musical narrative with 
another person: as a listener, understanding her or his metaphorical emotional-cognitive 
journey in sound; as a player, knowing how (and wanting) to convey her own interpretations to 
those around; and as a co-performer, engaging discerningly in empathic creativity. Since Romy 
is capable of improvising coherently and expressively with musicians with whom she has not 
worked before, she evidently has musical empathy beyond a few known individuals: she 
possesses what may be termed ‘cultural empathy’ in the domain of music (a term coined in the 
context of multicultural counselling by Ridley and Lingle in 1996). 
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Figure 22  Romy shows mature reactive and proactive musical empathy (Level 6) 
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Figure 23  Romy and a community musician share a mature empathic creativity (Level 6). 
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this a necessary connection, though? The vignettes and corresponding analyses pertain to young 
people who are consciously not ‘neurotypical’, since, as we noted above, it is believed that those 
on the autism spectrum or who have learning difficulties (or both) may, by their very atypicality 
(including spiky developmental profiles in which the growth of ‘everyday’ empathy is often 
inhibited), offer insights that may be obscured in those with a more even spread of intellectual 
and personality traits. However, the notion of musicality is blind to cerebral ‘otherness’ (or, 
indeed, disability): irrespective of individuals’ general levels of mental functioning, for them to 
engage with music is, by definition, for them to engage with the products of other minds. That 
is to say, one cannot understand music without understanding (albeit intuitively) how other 
minds work – that is, without musical empathy – whether that manifests itself through joining 
in with a regular beat (Sounds of Intent, Level 3), chanting on the football terraces (Level 4), 
singing along with a favourite track on the car radio (Level 5), or anticipating (and relishing) the 
expressive shifts in tempo of a performance of Elgar’s cello concerto (Level 6). What the 
scenarios suggest is that as musical understanding becomes more advanced, so, necessarily, 
does musical empathy. Moreover, it is worth noting that it is not so much musical content that 
changes between levels but structure, which in empathetic terms implies that it is not so much 
feelings that are likely to evolve as thoughts. 
 
It is of interest to observe that, just as musical engagement moves in broad terms from 
connection with significant others at Levels 3 and 4, to interaction with increasingly wide 
groups of peers and fellow music-makers at Levels 4 and 5, and in due course to participation 
in music-cultural activity at Levels 5 and 6, so musical empathy follows a similar path: from 
sharing musical thoughts and feelings with other individuals (what may be termed 
‘interpersonal’ musical empathy) to more diverse and less familiar sets of people (‘group’ 
musical empathy) and eventually to those within wider society, who may even be strangers 
(‘cultural’ musical empathy). The similarity of this conceptualisation with Bronfenbrenner’s 
ecological systems theory (originally set out in 1979) seems inescapable – see Figure 24. 
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Figure 24  Musical empathy extending further into communities of others with maturation. 
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terms of styles of listening and performance, as we saw in the case of Freddie (who functions at 
Sounds of Intent Level 5), attention can largely be devoted to structure at the expense of content: 
in simple terms, Freddie appears to have a love of repetition for its own sake. 
 
But for most listeners, musical ‘thoughts’ (as opposed to feelings) apparently exist most if not 
all of the time beneath the surface of awareness: people can unthinkingly enjoy the emotional 
narrative of a piece as it flows by in their stream of consciousness without being sensible of its 
structure. Hence a conceptually naïve though perceptually experienced listener of a Mozart’s 
Jupiter symphony may intuitively delight in the sense of return that the recapitulation brings in 
the fourth movement, and feel an empathy for the way that, for example, the Chamber 
Orchestra of Europe under Nikolaus Harnoncourt ushers it in with the subtlest use of rubato in 
the preceding bar, without consciously being aware that this constitutes a restatement of the 
opening material. In reality, of course, the feeling of ‘coming home’ after the peregrinations of 
the development section is due to the fusion of structure and content generating a blend of 
thoughts and feelings, and evoking a response that evolves as a combination of affect and 
cognition; it is just that, in the case of the wholly intuitive listener, the former is foregrounded 
in consciousness while the latter is less salient. Yet it is safe to assume that Harnoncourt and 
the musicians of the orchestra, with their advanced musical training, would have recognised the 
recapitulation on an intellectual level (as well as ‘feeling’ it). Hence there seems to be an 
asymmetry in the way that the musicians and many audience members may be perceiving the 
music. But surely such a mismatch creates difficulties for the notion of musical empathy as 
defined here? This is the issue to which we next turn our attention. 
 
 
3. Since those engaging in a common musical activity may do so in different ways and at different levels, so 
the nature of the musical empathy they experience may differ too.  
 
In the scenarios presented above, those engaging with the children tended to use material that 
were intended to match their levels of musical development. For example, Chloe’s class teacher 
tapped a regular beat for her to hear and imitate; Drew’s music teacher enticed him to 
participate in musical activity with hooks from his favourite pop songs; and Freddie’s piano 
teacher played him pieces, such as Eye Level, that were saturated with repetition. However, there 
were also occasions when the adults concerned sensed that their own perception of the music 
may have differed from that of the children’s: Freddie’s teacher suspected that he himself paid 
more attention to the content of the music than did his pupil, for example (for whom, as we 
have seen, structure appeared to be all important). In fact, it seems almost certain that most of 
the many thousands of hours of music that the children described in the scenarios are likely to 
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have encountered incidentally in everyday life comprised pieces that were not designed with 
their music-developmental levels in mind, since they are likely largely to have been created and 
performed by professional musicians functioning at Sounds of Intent Level 6. And of the six 
children mentioned, only Romy has the capacity to appreciate fully the musical messages that 
are being conveyed and to experience a mature empathetic response. But what of Amelia, 
Ethan, Chloe, Drew and Freddie? What reasonable assumptions can we make about their 
understanding of and reactions to the music they hear, and what musical empathy are they likely 
to feel? 
 
As we saw in relation to the zygonic analysis of the first movement of Beethoven’s 5th 
Symphony shown in Figure 8, an important feature of the way music works is that structure 
typically functions on several different levels at once. For instance, we observed that a 
prerequisite of the cognition of groups of notes (Level 4) is to hear patterning at Level 3 
(imitative relationships between individual events), and an awareness of organisation at Level 5 
(frameworks) is predicated on the experience of previously having processed the 
interconnections in the domains of pitch and perceived time between numerous groups 
(Level 4). Investigation of the ways in which young children engage with music (Voyajolu and 
Ockelford, n.d.; Ockelford and Voyajolu, n.d.) suggests that the developing brain is capable of 
extracting simpler musical information from the more complex. For example, a two-and-a-half-
year-old may dance in time to the beat of a song without grasping its overall structure, while a 
three-year-old may sing along with a repeated motif without being able to reproduce the whole 
melody of which it forms a part. It seems that, in developmental terms, the brain first searches 
for simple patterns of repetition and regularity that may exist on a moment-to-moment basis in 
the music, before seeking out groups, which require a process of eduction somewhat removed 
from the perceptual surface, and make greater demands on attention and memory. Frameworks 
require the most mental activity of all, with the abstraction of wholly abstract, probabilistic 
patterns of intervals that we can assume reside deep in long-term memory. Hence, it seems 
reasonable to assume that, reactively, in relation to a given performance of a particular piece, 
children will feel musical empathy in a form that accords with their capacity to process the 
music rather than necessarily being at the level of those who composed and performed it. And 
similarly, as youngsters proactively produce music themselves, or interactively make a 
contribution to a joint musical enterprise, any empathy they experience will be limited by their 
music-developmental level rather than by what the musical materials potentially have to offer.  
 
For example, let us imagine that Amelia, Ethan, Chloe, Drew, Freddie and Romy are all played 
a recording of ‘When I am laid in earth’ from Purcell’s Dido and Aeneas, sung by Emma Kirkby. 
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What musical empathy is each of them likely to feel? Given that none of them has fully 
functioning expressive language, the strongest source of evidence is likely to be found in the 
musical responses that they may make. In Amelia’s case, her lack of any reaction to the lament 
(as to all other sound and music) suggests that she derives nothing from the musical exposure 
nor, therefore, experiences any empathy. Through emotional contagion, Ethan may feel sadness 
at points in the melody such as those at which Dido sings ‘ah!’ in a kind of musical wail and 
respond with his own cries (see Figure 25). Chloe may show her empathy for Kirkby’s 
performance (at the level of ‘here is someone like me’) through short busts of entrained moving 
or tapping to the underlying pulse, particularly when the beat is set out clearly in the vocal line 
(as in the opening two bars, for example). Drew may pick up on the repeated iambic pairs of 
descending semitones in the bass and subsequently use these as a resource for improvising, 
implying a realisation, at some level, that ‘here is someone like me who is nonetheless distinct’. 
Freddie may well recognise the minor mode, though he is not likely to engage with it on an 
emotional level. However, he may observe that the bass line is repeated throughout, and later 
enjoy playing this over and over again while he listens to the recording. Freddie’s contribution 
is likely to be loud and boisterous, apparently trying to push the tempo forward in an effort to 
get to the next iteration as soon as possible! In empathetic terms, we can assume that he has an 
intuitive sense that Kirkby and her fellow performers are ‘like him but different’ and able to 
share a common musical purpose over time. Similarly, after several hearings of the recording, 
Romy may wish to perform the melody herself on the piano. She is likely to have developed an 
implicit understanding of the metaphorical narrative of the piece, leading her, like Kirkby, to 
linger on the climactic top G for expressive effect, as well as emphasising it through a louder 
dynamic, and reducing the tempo at the end of the (originally instrumental) coda. Hence she 
will empathise with the performance in a musically mature way.  
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Figure 25  Six levels of musical empathy. 
 
In summary, then, it appears that there are six distinguishable stages of musical empathy, which 
are inherent in developing musicality, and that the Sounds of Intent levels can potentially function 
as proxy music-empathetic measures – offering a ‘music-empathetic quotient’, along the lines of 
the so-called ‘EQ’ developed by Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004) and Wakabayashi et al. 
(2006). It is also worth noting that, generally speaking, there is an increase in the duration of 
empathetic engagement as musicality matures. 
 
4. Musical empathy is distinct from and can exist in isolation from ‘everyday’ empathy  
 
The examples of children and young people on the autism spectrum and with learning 
difficulties indicate that empathy that arises from music’s structure and content (through ‘intra-
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musical’ factors) is distinct from everyday empathy, and can exist in isolation from it (see Figure 
26). That is not to say, of course, that such a disconnect is the norm: experience suggests that 
most people, insofar as they can appreciate music, have musical empathy in addition to the 
general kind. Whether, and if so how, these two mental phenomena interact should be the 
subject of future research, which could be of particular value for those working with children 
on the autism spectrum, since it may facilitate the development of pedagogical strategies 
through which musical empathy could be used to promote empathy in other-than-musical 
contexts. Conversely, it may also be the case, to the extent that there are some people who do 
not appear to like music or wish to engage with it at all, for musical empathy to be limited or 
even absent. Again, this is an area requiring further research. 
 
Finally, to the extent that musical meaning can be generated through the association of 
particular pieces or excerpts with events, places or people (‘extra-musical’ factors), it is possible 
for everyday empathy to be elicited through music on account of an extra-musical symbolic 
connection (rather in the way that verbal narratives can evoke empathy through the meaning of 
the words rather than their sounds, although onomatopoeia may play a subsidiary role). This was 
the case with Drew’s music teacher (see Figure 18) who played him the hook of a pop song 
since he was aware that this had pleasant associations for Drew on account of his father’s band 
playing it. One could imagine other cases in which one was cognisant of people’s likely 
reactions to pieces that had been played at a happy occasion (their wedding, for example), or a 
sad one, such as a close friend’s funeral. 
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Figure 26  Modelling the relationship between everyday empathy and musical empathy. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The foregoing case studies and discussion enable us construct a general model of musical 
empathy, by detailing the nature of the relationship between composer and performer (or 
improviser) and listener. This is shown in Figure 27, where the following sequence of events is 
illustrated. First, a composer creates music, by producing particular structure and content in the 
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domain of sound, which he or she will be aware can convey certain thoughts and feelings. 
Sometimes, the desire to express (and communicate) particular musical thoughts and feelings 
may dictate the choice of structure and content (in the case of composers of film music, for 
example). Performers take the information about the new music provided by the composer 
(either indirectly through notation or directly through hearing it played or sung) and add their 
own layer of interpretation through expressive devices such as rubato, vibrato and variations in 
timbre and dynamics. The result is a fusion of structure and content, which elicits a blend of 
thoughts and feelings that makes up an ‘aesthetic response’. In the case of improvisation, this 
synthesis (and the creation of an aesthetic response) occurs in the moment. 
 
Listeners perceive the integrated flow of musical structure and content over time, which in turn 
evokes a combination of thoughts and feelings that constitutes their own aesthetic response. To 
the extent that this is similar to that which the composer and performer (or improviser) 
intended to be conveyed, so the listener can be said to have ‘musical empathy’ with the creator 
and re-creator of the music.  
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Figure 27  A model of mature musical empathy (proactive and reactive). 
 
In the case of two people (or more) improvising together, the model may be modified as shown 
in Figure 28. As we noted above, the result is ‘empathic creativity’ (Cross, Laurence and 
Rabinowitch, 2012). 
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Figure 28  A model of mature musical empathy (interactive).
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